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ABSTRACT
A key agreement problem is considered that has a biometric or
physical identifier, a terminal for key enrollment, and a terminal
for reconstruction. A nested convolutional code design is proposed
that performs vector quantization during enrollment and error
control during reconstruction. Physical identifiers with small bit
error probability illustrate the gains of the design. One variant of
the nested convolutional codes improves on the best known key
vs. storage rate ratio but it has high complexity. A second variant
with lower complexity performs similar to nested polar codes. The
results suggest that the choice of code for key agreement with
identifiers depends primarily on the complexity constraint.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Irises and fingerprints are biometric identifiers used to authenticate
and identify individuals, and to generate secret keys [4]. In a digital
device, there are digital circuits that have outputs unique to the
device. One can generate secret keys from such physical unclonable
functions (PUFs) by using their outputs as a source of randomness.
Fine variations of ring oscillator (RO) outputs, the start-up behavior
of static random access memories (SRAM), and quantum-physical
readouts through coherent scattering [37] can serve as PUFs that
have reliable outputs and high entropy [11, 18]. One can consider
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them as physical “one-way functions” that are easy to compute and
difficult to invert [33].
There are several security, privacy, storage, and complexity con-
straints that a PUF-based key agreement method should fulfill. First,
the method should not leak information about the secret key (neg-
ligible secrecy leakage). Second, the method should leak as little
information about the identifier (minimum privacy leakage). The
privacy leakage constraint can be considered as an upper bound
on the secrecy leakage via the public information of the first en-
rollment of a PUF about the secret key generated by the second
enrollment of the same PUF [12]. Third, one should limit the stor-
age rate because storage can be expensive and limited, e.g., for
internet-of-things (IoT) device applications. Similarly, the hardware
cost, e.g., hardware area, of the encoder and decoder used for key
agreement with PUFs should be small for such applications.
There are two common models for key agreement: the generated-
secret (GS) and the chosen-secret (CS) models. An encoder extracts a
secret key from an identifier measurement for the GS model, while
for the CS model a secret key that is independent of the identifier
measurements is given to the encoder by a trusted entity. In the clas-
sic key-agreement model introduced in [1] and [31], two terminals
observe correlated random variables and have access to a public,
authenticated, and one-way communication link; an eavesdropper
observes only the public messages called helper data. The regions
of achievable secret-key vs. privacy-leakage (key-leakage) rates
for the GS and CS models are given in [19, 26]. The storage rates
for general (non-negligible) secrecy-leakage levels are analyzed in
[23], while the rate regions with multiple encoder and decoder mea-
surements of a hidden source are treated in [16]. There are other
key-agreement models with an eavesdropper that has access to a
sequence correlated with the identifier outputs, e.g., in [6, 8, 12, 22].
This model is not realistic for PUFs, unlike physical-layer security
primitives and some biometric identifiers that are continuously
available for physical attacks. PUFs are used for on-demand key
reconstruction, i.e., the attack should be performed during execu-
tion, and an invasive attack applied to obtain a correlated sequence
permanently changes the identifier output [11, 13]. Therefore, we
assume that the eavesdropper cannot obtain a sequence correlated
with the PUF outputs.
Two classic code constructions for key agreement are code-offset
fuzzy extractors (COFE) [10] and the fuzzy commitment scheme
(FCS) [21], which are based on a one-time padding step in combi-
nation with an error correcting code. Both constructions require
a storage rate of 1 bit/symbol due to the one-time padding step. A
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Slepian-Wolf (SW) [38] coding method, which corresponds to syn-
drome coding for binary sequences, is proposed in [5] to reduce the
storage rate so that it is equal to the privacy-leakage rate. It is shown
in [14] that these methods do not achieve the key-leakage-storage
boundaries of the GS and CS models.
Wyner-Ziv (WZ) [42] coding constructions that bin the observed
sequences are shown in [14] to be optimal deterministic code con-
structions for key agreement with PUFs. Nested random linear
codes are shown to asymptotically achieve boundary points of the
key-leakage-storage region. A secondWZ-coding construction uses
a nested version of polar codes (PCs) [3], which are designed in [14]
for practical SRAM PUF parameters to illustrate that rate tuples
that cannot be achieved by using previous code constructions can
be achieved by nested PCs.
A closely related problem to the key agreement problem is
Wyner’s wiretap channel (WTC) [41]. The main aim in the WTC
problem is to hide a transmitted message from the eavesdropper
that observes a channel output correlated with the observation of
a legitimate receiver. There are various code constructions for the
WTC that achieve the secrecy capacity, e.g., in [2, 25, 28, 30], and
some of these constructions use nested PCs, e.g., [2, 28]. Similarly,
nested PCs are shown in [7] to achieve the strong coordination
capacity boundaries, defined and characterized in [9].
We design codes for key agreement with PUFs by constructing
nested convolutional codes. Due to the broad use of nested codes in,
e.g., WTC and strong coordination problems, the proposed nested
convolutional code constructions can be useful also for these prob-
lems. A summary of the main contributions is as follows.
• We propose a method to obtain nested tailbiting convolu-
tional codes (TBCCs) that are used as a WZ-coding construc-
tion, which is a binning method used in various achievability
schemes and can be useful for various practical code con-
structions.
• We develop a design procedure for the proposed nested con-
volutional code construction adapted to the problem of key
agreement with biometric or physical identifiers. This is an
extension of the asymptotically optimal nested code con-
structions with random linear codes and PCs proposed in
[14]. We consider binary symmetric sources and binary sym-
metric channels (BSCs). Physical identifiers such as RO PUFs
with transform coding [15] and SRAMPUFs [29] aremodeled
by these sources and channels.
• We design and simulate nested TBCCs for practical source
and channel parameters obtained from the best PUF design in
the literature. The target block-error probability is PB = 10−6
and the target secret-key size is 128 bits. We illustrate that
one variant of nested codes achieves the largest key vs. stor-
age rate ratio but it has high decoding complexity. Another
variant of nested codes with lower decoding complexity
achieves a rate ratio that is slightly greater than the rate
ratio achieved by a nested PC. We also illustrate the gaps to
the finite-length bounds.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we describe
the GS and CS models, and give their rate regions that are also
evaluated for binary symmetric sequences. We summarise in Sec-
tion 4 our new nested code construction that uses convolutional
codes. In Section 5, we propose a design procedure for the new
nested TBCCs adapted to the key agreement with PUFs problem.
Section 6 compares the estimated decoding complexity of TBCCs
and PCs. Section 7 illustrates the significant gains from nested
convolutional codes designed for practical PUF parameters as com-
pared to previously-proposed nested PCs and other channel codes
in terms of the key vs. storage rate ratio.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Notation
Let F2 denote the finite field of order 2 and let Fa×b2 denote the set
of all a × b matrices over F2. Rows and columns of a × b matrices
are indexed by 1, . . . ,a and 1, . . . ,b, and hi, j is the element in the
i-th row and j-th column of a matrix H. Fa2 denotes the set of all
row vectors of length a over F2. With 0a×b we denote the all-zero
matrix of size a × b. A linear block code over F2 of length N and
dimension K is a K-dimensional subspace of FN2 and denoted by(N ,K). A variable with superscript denotes a string of variables,
e.g., Xn =X1 . . .Xi . . .Xn , and a subscript denotes the position of a
variable in a string. A random variableX has probability distribution
PX . Calligraphic letters such as X denote sets, and set sizes are
written as |X|. Enc(·) is an encoder mapping andDec(·) is a decoder
mapping.Hb (x) = −x logx −(1−x) log(1−x) is the binary entropy
function, where we take logarithms to the base 2. The ∗-operator is
defined asp∗x = p(1−x)+(1−p)x . A BSCwith crossover probability
p is denoted by BSC(p). Xn ∼ Bernn (α) is an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) binary sequence of random variables
with Pr[Xi = 1] = α for i = 1, 2, . . . ,n.HT represents the transpose
of the matrix H. Drawing an element e from a set E uniformly at
random is denoted by
e
$←− E . (1)
2.2 Convolutional Codes
Denote the parameters of a block code generated by a binary con-
volutional encoder as (N ,K), where N is the blocklength and K is
the code dimension (in bits). At each time step, the convolutional
encoder receives k input bits and generates n output bits. The num-
ber of clock cycles needed to encode K bits is ℓ = Kk . We consider
convolutional encoders with a single shift register only. The shift
register consists ofm delay cells, wherem is also called the memory
of the encoder. The bit value stored in the i-th delay cell at time
step t is denoted by s(i)t ∈ F2 for i = 1, . . . ,m. For a given binary
input vector ut =
(
u
(1)
t ,u
(2)
t , . . . ,u
(k )
t
)
of length k at time step t , the
encoder outputs a binary vector ct =
(
c
(1)
t , c
(2)
t , . . . , c
(n)
t
)
of length
n. The encoder can be described by the state-space representation
of the encoder circuit such that the output ct is
ct = st · CT + ut · DT (2)
where st =
(
s
(1)
t , s
(2)
t , . . . , s
(m)
t
)
is the vector describing the content
of the shift register, C ∈ Fn×m2 is the observation matrix, and
D ∈ Fn×k2 is the transition matrix. The content of the shift register
for the next clock cycle at time step t + 1 is then
st+1 = st · AT + ut · BT (3)
+ s (1)t s
(2)
t
. . . s (m)t+ + +
B˜
C
D˜
+
c (n)t
c (2)t
c (1)t
......
. . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
u (1)t
u (2)t
u (3)t
u (k )t
Figure 1: Encoder circuit of convolutional codes described in Section 2.2.
where A ∈ Fm×m2 is the system matrix and B ∈ Fm×k2 is the control
matrix. For the case of a single shift register we have that the system
matrix is given by
A =
[
01×(m−1) 0
I(m−1)×(m−1) 0(m−1)×1
]
(4)
where I(m−1)×(m−1) ∈ F(m−1)×(m−1)2 is the identity matrix. For sim-
plicity, first entry of the input tuple u(1)t is always an input to the
shift register and thus we can write B = (eT1 |B˜) and D = (0n×1 |D˜),
where e1 is the unit row vector having a 1 in the first position and
0 everywhere else, B˜ ∈ Fm×(k−1)2 , and D˜ ∈ F
n×(k−1)
2 . The corre-
sponding encoder circuit is shown in Figure 1. Elements of a vector
entering a square box, which represents one of the aforementioned
matrices, depicts a vector-matrix multiplication, and the box with
the addition symbol depicts an elementwise vector-vector addition.
Therefore, the encoder of the convolutional code can be described
by the three matrices B˜, C, and D˜. We denote such an encoder by
[B˜,C, D˜].
Using the tailbiting method from [20, Chapter 4.8], we avoid hav-
ing a rate loss, unlike the zero-tail termination method. We have
N = ℓn and the resulting code rate is R = kn . A tailbiting convolu-
tional code (TBCC) can be represented by a tailbiting trellis using
ℓ sections and 2m states per section. The codewords correspond
to all possible paths in the trellis, where starting and ending states
coincide. TBCCs can be decoded by using the wrap around Viterbi
algorithm (WAVA) [36]. This decoder is suboptimal but performs
close to the performance of the maximum likelihood decoder.
Let Ad be the number of codewords of Hamming weight d for
d = 0, 1, . . . ,N , which characterizes the distance spectrum of a
TBCC. The weight enumerator polynomial A(X ) is then defined as
A(X ) def=
N∑
d=0
AdX
d . (5)
To compute the weight enumerator and to determine the distance
spectrum we use the approach described in [40]. Consider the state
transition matrix T(X ) of size 2m × 2m , where every entry ti, j (X ) is
either Xd , where d is the Hamming weight of the output produced
by the encoder when going from the state labeled with i to the state
labeled with j, or 0 if there is no possible transition between the
aforementioned states. Therefore, we have
A(X ) = Tr
(
Tℓ(X )
)
(6)
where Tℓ(X ) denotes multiplication of the matrix T(X ) with itself
ℓ times and Tr(·) denotes the trace.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the GS model in Figure 2(a), where a biometric or physical
source output is used to generate a secret key. The source X, noisy
measurement Y, secret key S, and storageW alphabets are finite
sets. During enrollment, the encoder observes the i.i.d. identifier out-
putXN , generated according to some PX , and computes a secret key
S ∈ S and public helper dataW ∈ W as (S,W )= Enc(XN ). During
reconstruction, the decoder observes a noisy source measurement
YN of the source output XN through a memoryless measurement
channel PY |X in addition to the helper dataW . The decoder esti-
mates the secret key as Ŝ =Dec(YN,W ). Furthermore, Figure 2(b)
shows the CS model, where a secret key S ′ ∈ S is embedded into
the helper data asW ′ = Enc(XN , S ′). The decoder for the CS model
estimates the secret key as Ŝ ′ = Dec(YN ,W ′).
PX (·)
(S,W ) (a)= Enc
(
XN
)
W ′ (b)= Enc
(
XN , S ′
)
PY |X (·)
Ŝ
(a)
= Dec
(
YN ,W
)
Ŝ ′ (b)= Dec
(
YN ,W ′
)(a)W(b)W ′
XN YN
Enrollment Reconstruction
S S ′ Ŝ Ŝ ′
(a) (b)(a) (b)
Figure 2: The (a) GS and (b) CS models.
Definition 3.1. Akey-leakage-storage tuple (Rs ,Rℓ ,Rw ) is achiev-
able for the GS and CS models if, given any ϵ > 0, there is some
N ≥ 1, an encoder, and a decoder such that Rs = log |S |N and
PB
def
= Pr[Ŝ , S] ≤ ϵ (reliability) (7)
1
N
I (S ;W ) ≤ ϵ (secrecy) (8)
1
N
H (S) ≥ Rs − ϵ (key uniformity) (9)
1
N
log
W ≤ Rw + ϵ (storage) (10)
1
N
I (XN ;W ) ≤ Rℓ + ϵ (privacy) (11)
where for the CS model, S and W in the constraints should be
replaced by, respectively, S ′ andW ′.
The key-leakage-storage regions Rgs and Rcs for the GS and CS
models, respectively, are the closures of the sets of achievable tuples
for the corresponding models. ♢
Theorem 3.2 ([19]). The key-leakage-storage region Rgs for the
GS model is the union of the bounds
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I (U ;Y ) (12)
Rℓ ≥ I (U ;X ) − I (U ;Y ) (13)
Rw ≥ I (U ;X ) − I (U ;Y ) (14)
over all PU |X such thatU − X − Y form a Markov chain. Similarly,
the key-leakage-storage region Rcs for the CS model is the union of
the bounds in (12), (13), and
Rw ≥ I (U ;X ). (15)
These regions are convex sets. The alphabetU of the auxiliary random
variable U can be limited to have size |U| ≤ |X| + 1. Deterministic
encoders and decoders suffice to achieve these regions.
Suppose the transform-coding algorithms proposed in [15] are
applied to RO PUFs or any PUF circuits with continuous-valued
outputs to obtain XN that is almost i.i.d. according to a uniform
Bernoulli random variable, i.e., XN ∼ BernN ( 12 ), and the channel
PY |X is a BSC(pA) for pA ∈ [0, 0.5]. The key-leakage-storage region
Rgs,bin of the GS model for this case is the union of the bounds
0 ≤ Rs ≤ 1 − Hb (q ∗ pA)
Rℓ ≥ Hb (q ∗ pA) − Hb (q)
Rw ≥ Hb (q ∗ pA) − Hb (q) (16)
over all q ∈ [0, 0.5] [19], which follows by using an auxiliary ran-
dom variable U such that PX |U ∼ BSC(q) due to Mrs. Gerber’s
lemma [42]. The rate tuples on the boundary of the region Rgs,bin
are uniquely defined by the ratio Rs
Rw
. We therefore use this ratio as
the metric to compare our nested TBCCs with previously-proposed
nested PCs and channel codes. A larger key vs. storage rate ratio
suggests that the code construction is closer to an achievable point
that is on the boundary of the region Rgs,bin, which is an optimal
tuple. We next focus on the GS model for code constructions. All
results can be extended to the CS model by using an additional
one-time padding step [12].
4 NESTED CONVOLUTIONAL CODE
CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we sketch the main steps to obtain a nested con-
struction for convolutional codes. Furthermore, we give two explicit
algorithms to find good code constructions. The first algorithm ad-
dresses the search of a good error correcting code (N ,Ks), denoted
by Cs, and the second algorithm finds a (N ,Kq) code Cq used as a
vector quantizer such that Cs is a subcode of Cq, i.e., Cs ⊆ Cq.
4.1 Nested Convolutional Codes
Using the encoder circuit depicted in Figure 1, we construct two
codes Cq and Cs such that Cs ⊆ Cq. Let Cq be the (N ,Kq) TBCC
with memory m and Kq = ℓkq generated by using the encoder
defined by the matrices [B˜, C˜, D˜]. Recall that B = (eT1 |B˜) with B˜ ∈
F
m×(kq−1)
2 and D = (0T |D˜) with D˜ ∈ F
n×(kq−1)
2 . By removing the
i-th column of B˜ and D˜ simultaneously, one obtains a new encoder
that generates a code of rate
kq − 1
n
, which is a subcode of the
original code. This is true, since the new code corresponds to all
codewords by encoding the original code but restricting to all inputs
where u(i)t = 0. By “freezing” further input bits we can therefore
obtain a subcode of rates
Rs =
1
n
,
2
n
, . . . ,
kq − 1
n
. (17)
To obtain codes with rates of better granularity between 1
n
and
kq − 1
n
that are not in (17), we can freeze input bits in a time-variant
manner. That is, by using the encoder ℓ times, we can freeze a
different amount of input bits in different clock cycles. This allows
to obtain codes of rates
Rs =
ℓ
N
,
ℓ + 1
N
, . . . ,
Kq
N
. (18)
Denote the parameters of the subcode, obtained by freezing input
bits accordingly, as (N ,Ks). Note that by freezing input bits in a
time-variant manner, Ks is not necessarily a multiple of ℓ. Further-
more, the procedure can be applied also to add columns to B˜ and
Algorithm 1: Search for (N ,Ks) TBCC Cs, Rs = 1
n
Input :n,m, Ks, PB,Wmax (maximum number of iterations)
Output :C ∈ Fn×m2
1 Initialize:
2 pc ← 0
3 C← 0
4 forw ← 1 toWmax do
5 C′ $←− Fn×m2
6 Compute Ad for the (N ,Ks) TBCC generated by [0,C′, 0]
for d = 0, . . . ,N using (5) and (6)
7 Find p′c such that: PUBB (Ad ,p′c) = PB
8 if p′c ≥ pc then
9 pc ← p′c
10 C← C′
11 return C
D˜ to generate a supercode. The design procedure of the nested
convolutional code construction is split into two steps:
(1) Search for a good error correcting code Cs of rate Rs = 1
n
=
Ks
N
at given target block error probability PB by finding an
appropriate matrix C.
(2) Expand the low rate code by finding appropriate matrices
B˜ and D˜ to obtain a good code of rate Rq =
kq
n
=
Kq
N
that
achieves a low average distortion q.
Note that for the first step we restrict to codes of rate Rs =
1
n
and hence the matrices B˜ and D˜ are vanishing. The first step can
also be performed for codes of any rate Rs >
1
n
, but then also the
appropriate matrices B˜ and D˜ have to be found accordingly.
4.2 Design of a Convolutional Code for Error
Correction
For fixed parameters n,m, and Ks, we try to find a matrix C such
that the resulting (N ,Ks) TBCC Cs at a given target block error
probability PB can be operated on a noisy BSC with large crossover
probability pc. To evaluate PB we use the union bound, see, e.g.,
[34], and the distance spectrum of the code. This gives an upper
bound on PB under maximum likelihood decoding. The bound is
given by
PB ≤ PUBB (Ad ,pc)
def
=
N∑
d=dmin
Ad
d∑
i= ⌈d/2⌉
(
d
i
)
pic(1 − pc)d−i (19)
where dmin is the minimum distance of the code.
The design of the code Cs is performed by a purely random
search of the matrix C as described in Algorithm 1. This algorithm
searches the best TBCC of rate Rs =
1
n
by randomly generating
different matrices C. The matrix C of the code that yields the largest
Algorithm 2: Search for (N ,Kq) TBCC Cq, Rq =
kq
n
Input :m, kq, ks,Wmax, C, B˜s ∈ Fm×(ks−1)2 , D˜s ∈ F
n×(ks−1)
2
Output : B˜q ∈ Fm×(kq−1)2 , D˜q ∈ F
n×(kq−1)
2
1 Initialize:
2 B˜q ← (B˜s |0)
3 D˜q ← (D˜s |0)
4 d ← 0
5 A← 0
6 forw ← 1 toWmax do
7 B′ $←− Fm×(kq−ks)2
8 D′ $←− Fn×(kq−ks)2
9 B˜′q ← (B˜s |B′)
10 D˜′q ← (D˜s |D′)
11 Compute dfree and Afree for [B˜q,C, D˜q]
12 if dfree > d or (dfree = d and Afree < A) then
13 d ← dfree
14 A← Afree
15 B˜q ← B˜′q
16 D˜q ← D˜′q
17 return B˜q, D˜q
pc at a given target block error probability PB is returned as the
output of Algorithm 1.
4.3 Design of a Convolutional Code for Vector
Quantization
In this section, an algorithm to obtain a high rate code from an
existing low rate convolutional encoder is explained. The algorithm
is presented in Algorithm 2. The inputs are the system matrix, the
observation matrix, and the transition matrix of the low rate code
with rate
Rs =
ks
n
. (20)
By randomly adding kq − ks columns to both, the system and the
transition matrix of a code of high rate
Rq =
kq
n
(21)
is constructed. The algorithm performs a random search and returns
the best configuration. As selection metrics, the free distance and
its multiplicity are chosen. The free distance dfree of a convolutional
code is defined as the minimum Hamming weight between any
two differing paths in the state transition diagram [20, Chapter 3].
Due to linearity of convolutional codes, dfree is also the minimum
Hamming weight over the nonzero paths. We denote by Afree the
multiplicity of paths that have Hamming weight dfree. To find a
good high rate code, we usedfree andAfree to select the best encoder.
The BEAST algorithm described in [20, Chapter 10] is a fast method
to compute dfree and Afree. The selection criterion is as follows:
Keep the code with largest dfree and in case of a tie decide for the
code with smaller Afree.
5 DESIGN OF NESTED CONVOLUTIONAL
CODES FOR PUFS
Algorithms 1 and 2 are combined to find good nested code construc-
tions for the coding problem described in Section 3. Two TBCCs
Cs and Cq of the same length N are needed such that Cs ⊆ Cq. Let
Kq and Ks denote the dimensions of Cq and Cs, respectively, and
let Rq =
Kq
N and Rs =
Ks
N denote their code rates. The objective
is to maximize the key vs. storage rate ratio. Since Rs =
Ks
N
and
Rw =
Kq − Ks
N
, we have
Rs
Rw
=
Ks
Kq − Ks =
(
Rq
Rs
− 1
)−1
. (22)
Therefore, we maximize Rs and minimize Rq simultaneously.
To reconstruct the key S of size Ks (in bits) the code Cs has to
correct errors on the artifical BSC channel with crossover probabil-
ity pc = q ∗ pA at a given target PB. The code Cq serves as a vector
quantizer with average distortion q such that [14]
q ≤ pc − pA1 − 2pA . (23)
The design procedure is then as follows:
(1) Choosem and n to design a TBCC of rate Rs =
1
n
by using
Algorithm 1.
(2) Obtain the corresponding value ofpc where the code achieves
the target block error probability PB by Monte Carlo simula-
tions.
(3) Construct code Cq from Cs by using Algorithm 2 such that
(23) is satisfied.
The last step in this procedure is executed by applying Algorithm 2
incrementally as follows:
(1) Initialization: Start constructing a code C(0)q of rate R(0)q =
2
n
from code Cs (Algorithm 1).
(2) Set i ← 1.
(3) Construct a code C(i)q of rate R(i)q =
i + 2
n
from code C(i−1)q
(Algorithm 2).
(4) If the average distortion achieved by the code C(i)q satisfies
the constraint given in (23), stop; else increment i ← i + 1
and go to step (3).
The final code Cq is the code in the last iteration. To obtain code
rates in between those steps we randomly freeze inputs of the
encoder in a time-variant manner as described in Section 4. Since
in each iteration the code is optimized for the minimum distance
of the code, we can only freeze inputs on the last added input. This
way we guarantee to preserve the minimum distance of the code
for the next iteration due to C(i−1)q ⊆ C(i)q .
6 ESTIMATED DECODING COMPLEXITY
We compare the decoding complexities of TBCCs and PCs. Since
the real complexity of decoding depends on the hardware imple-
mentation, we only estimate the complexity for both code classes
by using standard decoding algorithms.
The WAVA algorithm performs standard Viterbi decoding on
the tailbiting trellis of the TBCC in a circular fashion. That means
the decoder runs over the trellis several times and at each iteration
the probabilities of the starting states of the trellis are updated
according to the probabilities of the ending states of the previous
iteration. Therefore, the WAVA algorithms scales with the complex-
ity of a standard Viterbi decoder times the number of iterations.
For simplicity, we consider the worst case complexity and hence let
V denote the number of maximum iterations of the WAVA decoder.
According to [27], let κ be the complexity of a standard Viterbi
decoder with indices
• F for Forney trellis,
• P for precomputation,
• M for merged or minimal trellis.
We have for the total of number Nn of trellis sections
κF ∝ N · 2k+m (24)
κP ∝ N
n
(
2k+m + 2n
)
(25)
κM ∝ N · 2min{k,n−k }+m . (26)
By scaling these complexities with the maximum number of WAVA
iterationsV we obtain the desired complexities of decoding a TBCC.
For decoding on the Forney trellis, we can reuse the branch met-
rics computed in the first WAVA iteration in the following V − 1
iterations and; therefore, we obtain
κWAVAF ∝ (n +V − 1)
N
n
2k+m (27)
κWAVAP ∝
N
n
(
V · 2k+m + 2n
)
(28)
κWAVAM ∝ VN · 2min{k,n−k }+m . (29)
Overall we have that the complexity κWAVA of decoding a TBCC is
κWAVA ∝ min
{
κWAVAF ,κ
WAVA
P ,κ
WAVA
M
}
. (30)
For error correction and vector quantization, we obtain different
complexities since we have different values for k . For the error
correcting code we have k = ks = 1 and for the vector quantizer
code we havek = kq, wherekq is the largest value needed to achieve
a rate of Rq such that kq =
⌈
nRq
⌉
. The complexity of the vector
quantizer can be reduced by considering decoding over the trellis
with the time-variant frozen input bit values, since all branches
that do not correspond to the frozen input bit value can be removed.
For simplicity, we will only consider the complexity over the time-
invariant trellis.
For the PCs under successive cancellation list (SCL) decoding [39]
with a list size L, we have a complexity proportional to LN log2 N .
This complexity is independent of the code rate and thus applies to
Cs and Cq. All decoding complexities are summarized in Table 1.
Note that for the Viterbi decoder parallelization up to a factor of
2m can be easily achieved since all state nodes in a trellis section
Table 1: Complexities of the error correcting code Cs and vec-
tor quantizer code Cq for PCs and TBCCs.
Code class Complexity of Cs Complexity of Cq
TBCC κWAVAF ∝ (n +V − 1)Nn 2m ∝ (n +V − 1)Nn 2kq+m
TBCC κWAVAP ∝ Nn (V · 2m + 2n ) ∝ Nn
(
V · 2kq+m + 2n
)
TBCC κWAVAM ∝ VN · 21+m ∝ VN · 2min{kq,n−kq }+m
PC ∝ LN log2 N ∝ LN log2 N
can be processed independently. For the SCL decoding of PCs,
parallelization cannot be achieved without changing the decoder’s
error correction performance since each decoded bit sequentially
depends on the previously decoded ones.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS FOR PUFS
In this section, the performance of TBCCs designed by the proposed
procedure for the PUF setting is presented.We consider PUF devices
with pA = 0.0149, target block error probability PB = 10−6 and
a key size of Ks = 128 bits. These values correspond to the best
RO PUF designs in the literature [17]. We construct TBCCs with
rates Rs = 13 and Rs =
1
4 , and with memoriesm = 8 andm = 11.
As a reference, we also give a PC construction using the approach
described in [14]. Without puncturing we can only provide a PC
construction for the case of Rs = 14 , since for a key size of Ks = 128
and code rate Rs = 13 we would have N = 384 which is not a power
of two. All simulations for the PCs are performed by using SCL
decoding with a list size of L = 8. We also compute the results
for the rate 18 PC presented in [14] but now for pA = 0.0149 and
give the resulting key vs. storage rate ratio Rs
Rw
. All simulations
for the TBCCs are performed by using the WAVA algorithm with
a maximum of V = 4 iterations. The final results of all discussed
codes are given in Table 2.
7.1 Error Correction Performance
The construction of the nested code design starts with the error
correcting code Cs. We design two TBCCs with Rs = 13 and Rs =
1
4
by using Algorithm 1 withWmax = 104. Results of the Monte Carlo
simulations as well as the bound (19) are shown in Figures 3 and 4
for the two TBCCs.
To bound the code performance on a BSC for a given block length
and code rate we use two finite length bounds, namely the meta
converse (MC) and the random coding union (RCU) bound from [35].
The MC gives a lower bound and the RCU an upper bound on the
block error probability. For Rs = 14 , we observe that the TBCC
withm = 11 outperforms the PC, whereas the TBCC withm = 8
performs worse. We also observe that for all considered codes there
is still a gap to the finite length bounds.
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Figure 3: Error correcting performance of different codes
with Ks = 128 bits and Rs = 13 over a BSC with crossover
probability pc. The MC and RCU bounds for the same code
parameters are given as references.
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Figure 4: Error correcting performance of different codes
with Ks = 128 bits and Rs = 14 over a BSC with crossover
probability pc. The MC and RCU bounds for the same code
parameters are given as references.
Table 2: Parameters of the designed codes for Ks = 128 bits, pA = 0.0149 and PB ≤ 10−6 and complexities for Cs and Cq,
respectively. For the TBCCs also the type of complexity (κWAVAF ,κ
WAVA
M or κ
WAVA
P ) which is minimal is given.
⌈
log2 |W|
⌉
is the
amount of helper data in bits.
Code m Rs pc q¯ Rq Rw
⌈
log2 |W|
⌉ Rs
Rw
Complexity Cs Complexity Cq
TBCC 11 13 0.0545 0.0408 0.8047 0.4714 181 0.7072 κ
WAVA
P ∝ 221.00 κWAVAM ∝ 221.58
TBCC 8 13 0.0365 0.0223 0.8906 0.5573 214 0.5981 κ
WAVA
P ∝ 218.00 κWAVAM ∝ 218.58
TBCC 11 14 0.0837 0.0709 0.6680 0.4180 214 0.5981 κ
WAVA
P ∝ 221.00 κWAVAM ∝ 223.00
TBCC 8 14 0.0640 0.0507 0.7441 0.4941 253 0.5059 κ
WAVA
P ∝ 218.01 κWAVAM ∝ 220.00
PC - 14 0.0778 0.0648 0.6875 0.4375 224 0.5714 ∝ 215.17 ∝ 215.17
PC - 18 0.1819 0.1721 0.3584 0.2333 239 0.5358 ∝ 216.32 ∝ 216.32
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Figure 5: Code rate of the vector quantizer code Cq vs. aver-
age distortion q¯ for N = 384 bits and PB ≤ 10−6.
7.2 Vector Quantization Performance
Using the approach described in Section 4 and settingWmax = 104,
we construct high rate codes to be used as a vector quantizer. Using
Monte Carlo simulations, we plot the rate of these codes Rq vs.
the measured average distortion q¯ in Figures 5 and 6 for N = 384,
corresponding to Rs = 13 , and forN = 512, corresponding to Rs =
1
4 ,
respectively.
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Figure 6: Code rate of the vector quantizer code Cq vs. aver-
age distortion q¯ for N = 512 bits and PB ≤ 10−6.
We plot the approximate bound on the rate achieved for a given
distortion from [24]. The approximated rate for block length N is
R
(approx)
q
def
= 1 − Hb (q) +
log2(N )
2N +O
(
1
N
)
(31)
where O(·) denotes the big O notation. This approximation does
not consider the effect of the constraint that the error correcting
code designed in the previous subsection has to be a subcode of
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Figure 7: Storage-key rates for the GS model with pA = 0.0149. The (0.1118, 0.8882) bits/symbol point is the best possible point
achieved by SW-coding (SWC) constructions such as polar codes (PCs) in [5], which lies on the dashed line representing Rw +
Rs = H (X ). The PCs are designed by applying the design procedure proposed in [14] for WZ-coding with the SCL decoder with
list size of L. The block-error probability satisfies PB ≤ 10−6 and Ks = 128 bits for all codes. The finite length non-achievability
bound and its approximation for Ks = 128 bits is depicted as well.
the vector quantizer of rate Rq. Therefore, this bound only gives
an approximate achievable bound on the rate of the high-rate code
that is used as a vector quantizer without having any constraint.
The bound is plotted by neglecting the O
(
1
N
)
term.
Using (23), we obtain the target distortion for the code to be
designed, which allows to find a lower bound on the required rate
Rq of the vector quantizer. The results are shown in Table 2. Ob-
serve that vector quantization performance of all codes is similar.
Therefore, the code that has the best error correction performance
yields the smallest rate for vector quantization, which corresponds
to the smallest amount of helper data.
7.3 Overall Performance
Combining the results of the error correction and the vector quan-
tizer performance, we can evaluate the key vs. storage rate ratio
by using (22). The intermediate and final results are listed in Ta-
ble 2, and the achieved (Rw ,Rs ) tuples for all mentioned codes are
depicted in Figure 7.
For the nested WZ-coding construction, where we have a vector
quantizer and an error correcting code, we plot a finite length non-
achievability (converse) bound. For a fixed key size of Ks = 128
bits and pA = 0.0149, we evaluate the MC non-achievability bound
for the error correcting code and combine this bound using (23)
with the non-achievability bound from [24, (2.186)] for the vector
quantizer code. A slightly tighter version of the non-achievability
bound for the vector quantizer code can be found in [32]. To achieve
a distortion of q, any vector quantizer code of blocklength N must
satisfy [24, (2.186)]
⌊Nq ⌋∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
≥ 2N (1−Rq ). (32)
Similar to the achievability bound discussed in Section 7.2, (31) is
used to approximate also the non-achievability bound in (32). The
combination of theMC bound and the converse bound for the vector
quantizer performance establishes a non-achievability bound on
the best rate tuples that can be achieved for given parameters by our
WZ-coding construction. In Figure 7, we plot this non-achievability
bound using (32) and its approximation using (31). Note that the
zigzag behaviour of the bound in (32) is due to the floor function.
We observe a gap between these bounds and achieved rate tuples
by the designed codes.
The FCS and COFE have the key vs. storage rate ratio of
Rs
Rw
= Rs (33)
as the storage rate is 1 bit/symbol for these constructions. The
SW coding constructions such as the syndrome coding method
proposed in [5] achieve the ratio
Rs
Rw
=
Rs
1 − Rs (34)
which improves on the FCS and COFE. WZ coding constructions
with nested PC we constructed for pA = 0.0149 based on the design
procedure given in [14] achieves even larger ratios. The largest
key vs. storage rate ratio is achieved by the TBCC with Rs = 13
and m = 11 such that Rs
Rw
= 0.7072. These results suggest that
increasing the code rate Rs and the memory size of TBCCs allows
a larger key vs. storage rate ratio.
8 CONCLUSION
Weproposed a nested convolutional code construction, whichmight
be useful for various achievability schemes. For the key agreement
problem with PUFs, we proposed a design procedure for the nested
code construction using TBCCs to obtain good reliability, secrecy,
privacy, storage, and cost performance jointly. We implemented
nested convolutional codes for practical source and channel param-
eters to illustrate the gains in terms of the key vs. storage rate ratio
as compared to previous code designs. We observe that one variant
of nested convolutional codes achieves a higher rate ratio than all
other code designs in the literature but it may have a high hardware
cost. Another variant of nested convolutional codes with low com-
plexity is illustrated to perform similarly to the best previous codes
in the literature. We also computed known finite-length bounds for
our code construction to show the gaps between the performance
of the designed codes and these bounds.
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